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THE EFFECT OF LEGAL THEORIES ON JUDICIAL
DECISIONS
ANTHONY D'AMATO*

INTRODUCTION

Stanley Fish has argued that theory does not constrain practice.
Legal scholars by now are quite familiar with his argument. Yet they
go on using theory in their teaching and writing. Indeed, legal
theorizing seems to be healthier than ever. If you look at casebooks in
torts, contracts, or constitutional law that were published fifty years
ago, and compare them with today's casebooks, you will discover that
the old casebooks were filled almost entirely with cases. In contrast,
today's casebooks (more properly called coursebooks) are on average
half-filled with cases, the remaining pages containing articles, notes,
speeches, comments, and other materials dealing with various midlevel theories and concepts. The trend seems to be that "materials"
are on the upswing and "cases" on the downswing. Law school
teaching is becoming awash in theory.
If Fish is right, are all legal theorists wasting their (and their
students') time? In the present essay, I want to take the apparently
paradoxical position that Fish is absolutely right, and yet legal theory
is definitely not a waste of time. Students in law school learn how to
best predict what judges will decide the law to be. If judges are guided
by legal theories, then students of the law need to know what these
theories are. Yet if the decisions judges make are not constrained by
theory, then why should students learn the theories? In this essay, I
try to answer that question by introducing a distinction that, as far as I
know, has not previously been drawn in this context: between judicial
decision-making and a judge's decision-making. That distinction will
only make sense after we briefly review the basis for Fish's argument.
I. THEORY DOES NOT CONSTRAIN PRACTICE

Fish's argument can be summarized as follows. We derive theory
* Leighton Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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from practice; therefore, theory cannot constrain (or govern) the
practice from which it is derived:
This, then, is why theory will never succeed: it cannot help but
borrow its terms and its contents from that which it claims to
transcend, the mutable world of practice, belief, assumptions, point
of view, and so forth. And, by definition, something that cannot
succeed cannot have consequences, cannot achieve the goals it has
set for itself by being or claiming to be theory, the goals of guiding
and/or reforming practice.1
How does Fish's argument apply to legal theory? Ten years ago, I
wrote an essay entitled Can Any Legal Theory ConstrainAny Judicial
Decision?2 The idea behind the essay, which would have worked
better as a classroom dialogue than a published article, was roughly
this: name any legal theory that you say explains the result in any case
(or series of cases), and I will show you how that same legal theory
could just as satisfactorily explain the exact opposite result in that
case (or series of cases).' Since I did not have an interlocutor to pick
theories (as I might in a classroom), I chose some theories that are
widely accepted as explaining (constraining, governing) the results in
some famous cases. To make the theories representative of legal
theorizing in general, I chose theories that ranged from the very
broad to the very narrow:
1. A very broad theory: Judge Posner's theory that judges in
4
all cases should maximize wealth;
2. A narrower, subsidiary theory to the above: judges in all
cases should minimize transaction costs;5
3.
A combination of theories: the three Brest-Levinson
theories of the First Amendment-judges in all cases should
protect representative government, advance knowledge, and
6
promote truth;
1.

STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMEs NATURALLY 321 (1989).

2. Anthony D'Amato, Can Any Legal Theory Constrain Any Judicial Decision?, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 513 (1989) [hereinafter D'Amato, Theory]. I carried the argument further in
Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction:Refuting Indeterminacy with One Bold Thought,
85 Nw. U. L. REV. 113 (1990) (arguing that there are no easy cases); Anthony D'Amato, Can
Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA. L. REV. 561 (1989) (arguing
that legislative intent cannot be inferred); Anthony D'Amato, Counterintuitive Consequencesof
"PlainMeaning", 33 ARIZ. L. REV. 529 (1991) (arguing that plain meaning as a basis for judicial
decision-making is itself a theory that cannot work); and Anthony D'Amato, The Injustice of
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,64 U. CIN. L. REV. 911 (1996) (arguing that public policy as a
basis for judicial decision-making is itself a theory that cannot work).
3. See D'Amato, Theory, supra note 2, at 514.
4. See id. at 514-19.
5. See id. at 519-20.
6. See id. at 521-24.
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4.

An interpretive theory: the assertion that "strict
7
constructionist" judges will be "tough on crime";
5. A process theory: Dworkin's "chain novel" theory used to
8
explain stare decisis;
6. A mathematical theory: Judge Hand's negligence formula
used to explain tort cases;9 and
7. A theory so narrow that it can be stated in a single word: the
idea of "cost" to help explain the result in any given case. 10
Across this range of theories, I offered well-known case examples
typically cited as examples of each theory. Then I showed that the
exact same theory just used to justify or explain those case results
could be used to justify or explain the opposite result in each of those
cases. Thus, if Theory X can be "applied" in a case to reach the result
P wins and also to reach the result D wins, then Theory X can hardly
be said to "apply" at all. I contend that this is true of every theory
that has ever been said to apply in every case that has ever been
decided.
Of course, simply describing what I (believe I) proved in another
article is woefully insufficient; I invite the reader to consult the
original article. What is interesting here is that, ten years later, the
arguments in that article have not (so far as I am aware) been
challenged. My essay does not seem to have slowed down in the
slightest the burgeoning amount of theorizing going on in law
journals, casebooks, and classrooms. No one seems to have given up
on theorizing as a result of what Stanley Fish or I wrote over a decade
ago. And this, in a perverse sense, corroborates our anti-theory views.
For if, as Fish says, theory has no effect on practice,1 then his (and
my) anti-theory-which is itself a theory, of course-also cannot be
expected to have any discernible effect upon the academic practice of
theorizing! Our anti-theory, if unaccepted, is by that very fact
corroborated!What else could we expect? In Ira Gershwin's immortal
words, who could ask for anything more?
II. WHERE LEGAL THEORY SEEMED TO WORK

The most well-known and perspicuous case in the legal literature
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 524-27.
id. at 527-30.
id. at 530-34.
id. at 534-36.
FISH, supra note 1, at 321.
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that illustrates the force of legal theories in action is Lon Fuller's The
2 Fuller constructed his mythical
Case of the Speluncean Explorers.1
case on a stipulated set of facts and a single applicable one-sentence

statute (with no legislative history), thus giving the five justices of the
Newgarth Supreme Court no room to argue over the facts or
legislative materials. m3 Five speluncean explorers were trapped in a
cave for thirty-two days; they survived only by killing and eating the
flesh of one of their party. 4 After their rescue, they were prosecuted
under a statute that simply provided: "Whoever shall willfully take
the life of another shall be punished by death."15 Each justice applied
his deepest theory of law to the question whether the four surviving
16
speluncean explorers should be found guilty of murder.
None of the justices' theories could be labeled "ivory-tower."

Each justice took into account all the facts and circumstances of the
four defendants. Each justice thought about the effect of his decision
on society and its receptivity to the rule of law. Each justice
considered whether the Chief Executive would pardon the defendants

if they were convicted. In addition, each judge examined his own
moral impulses. In short, each justice had a world-view, shaped
through long experience in the deliberation and decision of cases, that

constituted for him an overarching commitment to the proper role
and function of courts in the legal system.
Chief Justice Truepenny's opinion was the most cut-and-dried:
the defendants clearly violated the statute and thus there was nothing
for the court to do but to find them guilty of murder. 7 But he went on

to urge the Chief Executive, in the strongest possible terms, to pardon

12. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949).
The opinions of the five justices in Fuller's article did not exhaust the range of applicable
theories. I added three new opinions (in memory of my mentor Lon Fuller) in an article
published in 1980. See Anthony D'Amato, The Speluncean Explorers-FurtherProceedings,32
STAN. L. REV. 467 (1980). Seven new opinions were added in a symposium issue in Naomi R.
Cahn et al., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: ContemporaryProceedings,61 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1754 (1993). Peter Suber has recently contributed nine additional opinions. See PETER
SUBER, THE CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS: NINE NEW OPINIONS (1998).

13. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century
Statutory Interpretationin a Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1731, 1731-32 (1993).
14. See Fuller, supra note 12, at 616-18.
15. Id. at 619.
16. It is perhaps a weakness in the case that no justice presented a strong argument that the
explorers were actually guilty of murder. I tried to present such an argument in the first of the
three opinions I wrote in 1980. See D'Amato, supra note 12, at 468-75. This particular opinion
has been reprinted in Feinberg & Gross's treatise on legal philosophy. See PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 549 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 5th ed. 1995).
17. See Fuller, supra note 12, at 619.
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the defendants.18
Justice Foster constructed two arguments on the basis of natural
law. First, he argued that the explorers, trapped in a cave, were
effectively removed from Newgarth's jurisdiction and hence were in a
"state of nature." Newgarth's laws, therefore, could not apply to
them.1 9 Second, and in the alternative, he accepted the applicability of
Newgarth's murder statute, but argued that its purpose-to deter
crime-could apply neither in the case of self-defense (a traditional
judge-created exception to the statute) nor to a case of necessity
where the only result would be that all five explorers would have
starved to death before they could have been rescued.20 Their decision
to consume the flesh of one of their number meant that four lives out
of five were saved, and it would be absurd now to sentence the
2
survivors to death. '
Justice Tatting's opinion can be said to reflect the legal theory of
deep uncertainty in the law. He noted strong objections to all the
arguments that had been made, both those in favor of convicting the
defendants and those that favored acquittal. 22 Torn by this
uncertainty, he withdrew from the case. 23
Justice Keen was a positivist in the grand Bentham-Austin
tradition. He believed that a judge should simply apply the words that
the legislature has enacted into law in the form of a statute.2 4 The
murder statute has no exceptions; therefore, the defendants have
violated it. No judge should allow his personal feelings to enter into a
case. Justice Keen said this in the strongest possible way: he began his
opinion by saying that if the decision were his to make in a private
capacity, he would not hesitate to free the defendants.Z But because
he is empowered to make the decision in his public capacity as a
26
judge, he has no choice but to find the defendants guilty.
Justice Handy's theory was one of legal realism. He stated that
public opinion polls showed that ninety percent of the public would
vote to acquit the defendants. 27 He also revealed that he heard,
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 620-23.
id. at 623-26.
id. at 625.
id. at 626-31.
id. at 631.
id. at 632.
id.
id.
id. at 639.
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through a friend of the Chief Executive's secretary, that if the court
found the defendants guilty, the Chief Executive would not pardon
them. 2 8 Since, realistically speaking, the pardoning route was not
available to the court, the decision that would best satisfy the public
and not make the court look foolish was to vote to acquit.29
The final vote on the supreme court was 2-2 (with Justice Tatting
having withdrawn).0 The decision of the judge below was thus
affirmed, and the speluncean explorers were sentenced to death.3'
Fuller constructed his case so well that there are four complete
theories that stand on their own merits-five if you include Tatting's
indeterminacy as a theory. Despite the criticisms that each justice
leveled at his brothers' theories, the opinions emerge as polished and
complete. We can well imagine that if the Supreme Court of
Newgarth had only one justice that was assigned to review this case,
then the outcome of the case would have been completely determined
by the deeply held theory of whomever of the five juristsTruepenny, Foster, Tatting, Keen, or Handy-was sitting on the
bench. But if there were more than two justices assigned to the case32
whether three, four, or five-then no theory could explain the result.
The theories would be incompatible with each other.
III. DWORKIN's THEORY
The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is certainly what we might
call a "hard case." Ronald Dworkin has taken the position that the
hard cases in principle have a unique solution if only the deciding
judge-whom he names Judge Hercules-had infinite time, all the
resources in the world, and infinite brain-power.3 3 One could respond
to Dworkin that since there are no such judges, hard cases in the real
world defy unique solutions. But this argument would miss Dworkin's
point: that in principle a unique solution exists, and hence real judges
should try to get as near to it as possible within the inevitable
constraints of time and money.
Rather, what I find fascinating about Dworkin's argument is the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
possible
case.
33.

See id. at 642.
See id. at 641-44.
See id. at 645.
See id.
If there were only two justices and they happened to be Truepenny and Keen, it is
that they could hammer out a variant of positivism to serve as their joint theory of the
See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977).
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not-often noticed point that he employs a single judge to do his
theoretical work. What if, instead, Dworkin had posited a panel of
three super-judges-Hercules, Kirkules, and Smerkules? Suddenly he
and his readers would have grave misgivings. For it is easy to imagine
that these three judges would each expend infinite time and resources
reading the same materials and yet come to divergent conclusions.
Suppose the case involved a hard issue of interpreting a clause in the
U.S. Constitution. Judge Hercules could find, after reading all the
materials, that the Madisonian world-view was the most persuasive
political theory informing the correct interpretation of this clause.
Judge Kirkules could find on the contrary that the Hamiltonian
world-view was the deepest and most persuasive theory. And Judge
Smerkules could find that both the Madisonian and Hamiltonian
views unfairly distorted the true intentions of the Framers, and hence
the most persuasive theory informing the proper interpretation of the
constitutional clause could only be one that was both anti-Madisonian
and anti-Hamiltonian.
Deeply-held theories are hard to reconcile with one another
(unless they turn out to be variants on the same theory). One can test
this by paying a visit to a good philosophy department. Arrange a
meeting with the specialist on analytic philosophy and ask her
whether she has many discussions with her colleague, the specialist on
metaphysical philosophy. She probably will say, "Yes, our children
are on the same little league team, so whenever we see each other we
talk baseball." "No," you say, "I mean discussions on philosophy."
She will probably answer, "Well, when I first came here years ago we
started into such a discussion, but we were really talking past each
other and it got a bit heated and we figured that talking about these
things would only lead to bad collegial feelings." "Well," you ask,
"what do you think of the things he's written?" "Frankly," she might
reply, "he addresses very large issues, like the ontology of the
universe. But I don't think he actually says anything at all. He's
totally ivory-tower." Then you pay a visit to the metaphysician and
get pretty much the same answers until the last question. He says,
"Frankly, she addresses very small issues that nobody in the world
cares about except other analytic philosophers-such as the
grammatical structure of simple sentences. She's totally ivory-tower."
If we go all the way back to Plato and Aristotle, we find that they
talked completely past each other. Plato's method was deductive: you
start with ideal forms and reason downward to get to the real world.
Aristotle's method was inductive: you begin with the real world and
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reason upward to get to theories. As Lon Fuller once resignedly told
me about another twentieth-century jurisprudential giant, H.L.A.
Hart, "I guess we're fated never to understand each other." Or, in the
immortal words of Gilbert & Sullivan:
I often think it's comical (fal, lal, la!)
How nature always does contrive (fa, lal, la!)
That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little Liberal
34
Or else a little Conservative.
So far we are left (I hope, if I have been doing my job right) with
an uneasy feeling. What good is theory unless it locks in a particular
solution to a problem? Why should professors be teaching legal
theory to their students? In the next and final part of this essay, I will
try to spell out my answers to these questions.
IV. THE UTILITY OF THEORY
As Einstein and many others have said, our theories of the world
determine the way we see the world. We cannot help but see the
world through the lens of our theories. "Einstein held that there is no
'real world' to which one can repair-the whole concept of the 'real
world' is justified only insofar as it refers to the mental connections
that weave the multitude of sense impressions into some connected
net."35 Since the deepest theories we hold in our minds interpret for
us what we see, it follows that for each of us our theories "work."
They "apply" to the real world. As Stanley Fish put it: "[T]heories
always work and they will always produce exactly the results they
predict, results that will be immediately compelling to those for whom
the theory's assumptions and enabling principles are self-evident.
36
Indeed, the trick would be to find a theory that didn't work."
But the important point is that although my theory works for me,
it does not necessarily work for you. My theories may appear to
constrain my decisions (whom I vote for, what I read, what I write)
but they certainly do not appear to constrain yours. They do not even
seem to make the slightest impression on my two sons, despite the
34. WILLIAM SCHWENCK GILBERT, IOLANTHE, OR, THE PEER AND THE PERI, act 2
(1882), reprinted in THE MIKADO AND OTHER PLAYS 107,141 (Modern Library ed. 1917).
35. Gerald Holton, 'What, Precisely, Is "Thinking"?' Einstein's Answer, in EINSTEIN: A
CENTENARY VOLUME 153, 158 (A.P. French ed., 1979).
36. STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE
COMMUNITIES 68 (1980).
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many years I put into bringing them up to understand, absorb, and
share my well-formulated theories of the world.
When we look at the decisions of judges, we can say that each
judge always follows her own theories. But we cannot say that any
judge always follows another judge's theories. Even if some judges
are strongly influenced by other judges-as Justice Thomas seems to
be influenced by Justice Scalia-no judge can see the world exactly
the way another judge sees it. Judge A cannot see as deeply into
Judge B's theory as Judge B sees it. For example, Judge B may
believe that legislative intent has nothing to do with the interpretation
of statutes. Judge A might be convinced by all the reasons that Judge
B has given in his opinions that legislative intent is irrelevant to
statutory construction. But then some day Judge B could surprise
everyone by saying that when a clause in the Constitution has to be
construed, the intent of the Framers is indeed relevant. Judge B might
not be able to draw a distinction that would convince his brethren on
the bench. Yet in his own mind, Judge B might "see" a world of
difference between a constitution and a statute-a difference so great
that no theory of interpretation could work for both. He might not be
able to articulate this difference in a principled way, except to say that
you cannot compare apples and oranges.37 After all, it is his theory of
statutory and constitutional construction, his way of looking at the
legal world, and if others do not see it or understand it, so much the
worse for them.
More generally, if I say that M is being inconsistent, M can reply,
"You can't understand the deep consistency that lies beneath the
surface inconsistency." M's theories always make sense-to M. They
make sense and they work.
So why do professors teach theories to law students? We might
be misled if we ask the students or the professors. A student might
say, "I'm learning this theory because I have to give it back on the
final exam." Another student might say, "This theory explains the
result in a line of cases-or at least the professor thinks so, and I
better be thinking the way the professor thinks if I want to do well on
the final." Another student might say, "This theory explains the cases
in this chapter. It explains them for me." A professor might reply,
"I've studied these cases intensely, and I only give my students the
37. Why not? I have often wondered. They are both fruit. They are both round. They both
grow on trees. They both contain seeds. Well, maybe the proper phrase is: you cannot mix
apples and oranges. No? I have actually seen it done. In a blender in my neighborhood health
food store. (But I was not the one who ordered it, and I would not think of drinking it.)
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best explanatory theory that I am capable of giving. I really believe
that these theories not only explain the case outcomes in the book,
but they are the best predictors we have of future judicial decisionmaking."
I do not know if these are the answers you will actually get if you
make inquiries, but if they are, I want to disagree with them. No
theory can explain the result in any case (as I argued in Part I of this
essay), just as no theory explained the result in The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers (as I argued in Part II).
But the judges in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers-and the
judges in every case that has ever been decided in any courtroom in
the world-believe that their own theories explain the decisions they
reach. They also believe that their own theories are sound. They
believe that if other judges disagree with their decisions, those other
judges are just plain wrong.
In other words, the judge is like the professor (in the third
paragraph above). Each judge believes that her own theory explains
the results in previous cases, stands as the best predictor of future
case results, and thoroughly accounts for the decision she has reached
in the instant case. The professor believes the same of the theories he
teaches to his students.
Thus, we are back to the distinction I drew in the beginning of
this essay: between judicial decision-making and a judge's decisionmaking. This turns out to be a distinction between the external point
of view and the internal point of view. When we look at judicial
decision-making, we are looking externally at a pattern of decisions
over time. We try to fashion a theory that "explains" this pattern, but
as Stanley Fish said in the first quotation in this essay, the pattern
gives rise to the theory and not the other way around. If the pattern
changes, we simply "refine" our theories. If someone claims that our
previous theory failed to explain the change in pattern, we respond
that a more sophisticated account of our previous theory-which was
inherent in the theory itself-would have succeeded in explaining the
change. Of course, what we have really done is modify the theory in
light of the change in the practical world.
The external point of view, then, does not work and cannot work.
Yet, it is the one we study. Why?
Simply because the external point of view helps us, in surrogate
fashion, to get partially inside the heads of the judges who will be
deciding the cases we will argue someday. Fortunately, all the judges
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in the United States once went through law school and learned
theories of law similar to the ones that are being taught today.
Accordingly, we have a fairly good idea of what the judges may be
theorizing simply by studying theories like the ones they studied.
For, ultimately, the essence of the lawyer's craft is not to learn
theories but to persuade judges. To persuade a judge, we should try to
discover what her theories are. In legal practice, we do this by reading
her previous opinions. We try to "locate" her theories within the
theories of law we learned while in law school. These theories we
learned in school, therefore, have a heuristic value. If a judge's
previous opinions reveal her to be a positivist, then we have an ideafrom the theories of positivism we have learned-how to bring our
client's side of the case within her theories. We will take a
"positivistic" approach if we want to persuade her, because we have
some confidence that that is the approach she will take in deciding the
case.
If another judge in another case demonstrates a "natural law"
view of the world, or a "legal realist" view, or a "pragmatic" view, or
a "formalistic" view, again, we will be at our persuasive best if we can
show how a proper interpretation of the facts of our client's case fits
within these overarching theories.3 8
My most important point is that we do these things not because
we believe that any theory of the law explains the law, but rather
because we understand that judges (from their internal point of view)
believe that their own theories explain the law. To be persuasive in
our advocacy, we must first identify the theory that the judge in our
case believes in (to the extent we can from prior opinions) and then
portray the facts of our case within that theory. We do not have to
believe that the theory will work at all times and all places; no theory
can "work" in that sense. All we have to believe is that the judge
believes that the theory will work in the instant case. In order to be
effective advocates, we need to persuade the judge by working within
her theory rather than confronting her with a different theory that we
may happen to think is "better" in some sense. The practice of law is
not about advocating the best explanatory theories (there is no such
thing); it is about persuading others whose theories are, to quote
Stanley Fish once more, "self-evident."

38. For further accounts of these various theories and their use in the art of persuasion, see
ANALYTIC JURISPRUDENCE ANTHOLOGY (Anthony D'Amato ed., 1996). The chapter headings

tell the story: Positivism, Natural Law, Formalism, Realism, Pragmatism, and Justice.

